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Quantum computational 
supremacy:  
Security and vulnerability 
in a new paradigm 
Deborah Brennan 
Abstract 
Despite three decades of research, the field of quantum computation has yet to 
build a quantum computer that can perform a task beyond the capability of any 
classical computer – an event known as computational supremacy. Yet this multi-
billion dollar research industry persists in its efforts to construct such a machine. 
Based on the counter-intuitive principles of quantum physics, these devices are 
fundamentally different from the computers we know. It is theorised that large-
scale quantum computers will have the ability to perform some remarkably 
powerful computations, even if the extent of their capabilities remains disputed. 
One application, however, the factoring of large numbers into their constituent 
primes, has already been demonstrated using Shor’s quantum algorithm. This 
capability has far reaching implications for cybersecurity as it poses an 
unprecedented threat to the public key encryption that forms an important 
component of the security of all digital communications. This paper outlines the 
nature of the threat that quantum computation is believed to pose to digital 
communications and investigates how this emerging technology, coupled with the 
threat of  Adversarial Artificial Intelligence, may result in large technology 
companies gaining unacceptable political leverage; and it proposes measures that 
might be implemented to mitigate this eventuality. 
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Introduction 
Scholarship in communications and media literacy has advanced into the 21st 
century too often by merely appending the word ‘digital’ to its categories of 
interest, and by adopting software-based tools to conduct some of its research. 
While long-term continuities in the issues affecting media production and 
dissemination are undoubtedly important, and there has been no shortage of 
investigation based upon the peculiar modes and interactions of the online 
communications environment, there has been a tendency for research to stop 
outside the door of computation itself, so that even the all-important algorithms 
that govern the behaviour of social media platforms are more likely to be 
mentioned in passing than probed in depth. Such relative indifference to 
computation would be more justifiable if we could assume, as many writers do, 
that technological advances in computing occur at a steady and predictable rate 
as the commercial focus of computation shifts to data analytics and methods of 
artificial intelligence (AI) such as machine learning (ML) and natural language 
processing (NLP). This assumption, however, ignores significant advances in the 
field of quantum computation. As one important scholar in this area stated in 
March 2018: ‘Whoever can build a fully functioning quantum computer will rule 
the world’ (Soo, 2018). In this paper, I will interrogate this proposition by exploring 
the ramifications of these advances for online security and further corporate 
control of the Internet.  The sections on quantum computers and P vs NP contain 
elements of quantum physics and mathematics, respectively, which I have 
attempted to present as clearly as possible with no prior knowledge required of 
the reader. I hope that the reader may enjoy these sections – however, the paper 
may be read without them. 
Quantum computers 
Despite three decades of research, as of 2018 quantum computation remains a 
multi-billion dollar industry that has yet to produce a working prototype with more 
than around 8 operational Bytes1. Potential quantum technologies are fraught 
with issues deriving from the science on which they depend, nonetheless, all of 
the major technology companies and a large number of governments and research 
                                                      
1 Opening the Facebook app and updating the stream, for example, might take in the region of 
10,000 times as many Bytes of data. 
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institutes continue to invest heavily in the field. Google, IBM and Microsoft along 
with the Chinese technology companies Alibaba and Tencent all have quantum or 
hybrid quantum-artificial intelligence (AI) laboratories with large research 
budgets. Government investments have also been generous, with the European 
Commission, for example, pledging €1 billion for research into quantum 
technologies (European Commission, 2016). The stated goal of organisations 
engaging in research in quantum computation is often the achievement of 
computational supremacy, the point where a quantum computer performs a 
computational task that is beyond the capability of any classical computer –
literally a paradigm-changing event for information technology.   
Quantum computers are entirely different in concept and operation from the 
computers we commonly use. Quantum devices operate according to two key 
postulates of quantum physics: superposition and entanglement. Superposition 
means that each quantum bit, or qubit, can represent both 1 and 0 at the same 
time whereas the more familiar bit must take either the value of 1 or 0. 
Theoretically, a qubit in superposition can hold an infinite amount of information 
which can be manipulated using quantum gates finally to yield a value of either 0 
or 1 on measurement2. It is theorised that this is one of the sources of the power 
of quantum computation. Entanglement means that qubits in a superposition can 
be correlated with each other allowing them to work together to facilitate 
something like massive parallel processing on a single device3. Quantum 
computers will exploit these properties to solve some problems that are 
considered very difficult or impossible using classical computers, and they will 
solve some of these problems at incredibly high speeds. The rewards for working 
hardware running novel algorithms from this new paradigm are expected to be 
very high, with promises of technologies offering considerable advances in fields 
such as artificial intelligence, molecular simulation, hyperreal gaming and stock 
market prediction. 
                                                      
2 This is according to the so-called Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics via the so-
called collapse of the wave function; the Multiverse or Many Worlds interpretation offers a 
different explanation. See, for example, Vaidman (2014) 
3 The mechanism by which this speedup occurs is still disputed and its nature has far reaching 
consequences for both quantum physics and quantum information theory. It has been suggested 
that the speedup lies either in quantum dynamics (Schrödinger equation) or in the quantum state 
itself (the wave function, 𝛹). 
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The extraordinary properties of entangled quantum bits in superposition mean 
that even a very small number can perform remarkable computation.  The most 
important quantum algorithm to date, the factoring algorithm due to Peter Shor 
(1994), is considered capable of factoring large integers (numbers) to their 
constituent primes by creating a what Pitowsky terms a ‘clever superposition’ 
(2002) of entangled qubits and extracting a solution in a short, or polynomial, time 
frame4. On a functioning 100 bit quantum computer, Shor’s algorithm could break 
RSA, the most commonly used public key encryption protocol on the Internet, in 
hours to days. Scaling up to Quantum Kilo Bytes, RSA public key encryption 
becomes completely ineffective.  
Shor’s algorithm belongs to a very significant class of quantum algorithms known 
as the Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP). Variants of this problem have been 
discovered that can, in theory, solve the mathematics behind RSA, ECDSA and DSA 
(Grosshans et al., 2015), all of the main public key encryption protocols in current 
use on the Internet. Clearly, quantum technologies pose a very real threat to 
current information security. 
The nature of information security 
There are many ways to conceptualise information security and this paper does 
not intend to detail these to any great degree; rather it endeavors to convey the 
idea that security needs to be complete, that every component of information 
security is a potential weak point that can be exploited regardless of the strength 
of the other components, much like how an open window in an otherwise secure 
building constitutes a weakness in its security. For the purposes of this paper the 
simple, but widely used, principles of the CIA Triad of Information Security5 – 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (Lefkovitz et al., 2017) – will be sufficient.  
Ensuring a high degree of confidentiality requires, but is not limited to, employing 
measures to actively ensure that sensitive information is not intercepted by 
unauthorized parties while in transit or in storage, while ensuring that resources 
                                                      
4 Shor’s algorithm has been run successfully on a true quantum device and has demonstrated the 
factorisation of small numbers, but the principle is proven for large numbers although there may 
be issues with scaling. 
5 The CIA Triad is a widely adopted information security benchmark model used to evaluate the 
information security of an organization, other models may be used to model individual aspects of 
security e.g. the PAIN (Privacy, Authority, Integrity & Non-Repudiation) model for cryptography. 
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are available to intended parties. Integrity means that data must not be altered in 
transit or in storage without authorization; among other measures this involves 
both symmetric (private key) and asymmetric (public key) encryption protocols. 
Ensuring availability includes security against denial of service (DoS) attacks that 
consume the entirety of a network’s resources, making them unavailable to 
legitimate users. Because of their threat to public key encryption, Shor’s and 
similar HSP algorithms are known to pose a risk to two of the Triad’s components, 
confidentiality and integrity. It is also thought that other quantum algorithms, 
such as variants of Grover’s algorithm (1996), may be used to exploit weaknesses 
in the implementation of some private key schemes6. 
Even without the use of quantum technologies, systems are under constant 
attack. Absolute security of data is impossible to achieve (and sometimes not 
desired7) and the cost increases greatly with the degree of security provided. A 
large proportion of costs incurred is due to the higher processing overheads 
required for stronger encryption; the other large cost is security expertise8. 
Different levels of security are provided for different internet and cloud services; 
for example, security policies for Internet banking are stricter than those for social 
media sites and messaging systems. A balance is always struck on the basis of the 
conflicting constraints of security and performance9, legal constraints and the 
value of the data to be protected. Although security systems vary greatly in terms 
of composition and policy, practically all use the same or very similar encryption 
protocols and these protocols all face the same risks, real and potential, from 
quantum computers10.  
The P vs. NP conundrum 
Mitigating the threat of quantum computers has been largely reduced to finding 
replacement algorithms for those behind the Public Key Protocols in current use, 
and this is not only because this is where the imminent threat is widely held to lie. 
                                                      
6 There may be other, as yet undiscovered, quantum algorithms which could threaten these 
same, and other, aspects of information security.  
7 This point is supported by the classification of cryptographic technologies as munitions under 
US law until 1992; certain restrictions remain under international agreements. 
8 Other costs include the cost of updating to current versions of software and software licences 
for firewalls and other security specific softwares. 
9 Strong encryption slows performance and can make system unacceptably slow for end users. 
10 Computer systems face very many other security threats; this will be discussed later. 
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Despite early successes in the field, quantum information theory has produced 
only a few algorithms, including Shor’s, that have been demonstrated capable of 
exponential speed up over their classical counterparts (Montanaro, 2015). 
Furthermore, many researchers are of the view that the once promised ubiquitous 
parallel processing power of quantum algorithms is in reality only possible in a 
very limited set of cases (Aaronson, 2013). The problem, they claim, comes down 
to the mathematics, specifically the computational complexity class of the 
mathematical problems under consideration. 
Loosely speaking11, computational complexity is a measure of how much 
computational resource (time, energy, etc) it takes a computer to find a solution 
to a mathematical problem and in particular, the manner in which the resource 
requirement grows as input size grows (e.g. polynomially or exponentially). In 
computational complexity theory, class P (polynomial time) are relatively easy 
problems for computers so, on average, take few resources or short time to solve. 
For an average input, class NP (nondeterministic polynomial time) problems take 
a lot more computational resources to solve and so a lot more time12. Rarely, a 
problem can be thought to be in NP but turns out to also be in P when a solution 
is found that is ‘simpler’ than expected. It can also be unclear to which class(es) a 
particular problem belongs13.  
In order to solve difficult problems in NP14 in a short time frame (or, equivalently, 
with few resources) these problems would need to reduced or broken down to a 
set of simpler problems in P. It is conjectured, but not proven, that this is not 
possible (Gill, 1977). The question is described in complexity theory as P vs NP and 
has great significance for computation in general15. It is argued that the 
capabilities of quantum computers are limited by the conjecture that P does not 
equal NP (Aaronson, 2013), that the class of problems in NP that are not also in P 
                                                      
11 For understandability, what is presented is really a description of computational difficulty 
which is in many ways analogous to computational complexity. 
12 Individual instances of a problem type can take significantly longer or shorter time to solve.  
13 There are more classes in the computational complexity hierarchy. This discussion is limited to 
P and NP for clarity and understandability and as P vs NP may be significant in quantum 
information theory. 
14 These problems are not also in the P complexity class, so do not have polynomial time 
solutions. 
15 The P vs NP is highly important in complexity theory, for both classical and quantum 
computing, it was chosen as one of the 7 most significant unsolved mathematical problems by 
the Clay Mathematics Institute, The Millennium Problems (Clay Mathematics Institute, 2000). 
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cannot be reduced to a set of simpler problems that can be solved easily and 
quickly, even by a quantum computer16. A subset of the NP class that is of 
particular interest to the field of quantum information theory, and any threat it 
poses to information security, is the NP-Complete class. NP-Complete problems17 
are a set of problems for which finding a solution to any one problem will also 
provide a solution to all other problems in the NP-Complete set. In other words, if 
a polynomial time solution is found for any one NP-Complete problem, it is found 
for all NP-Complete problems.  
The mathematical problem of factoring products of large prime numbers into their 
constituent parts, that problem that lies behind the security of the RSA security 
protocol, is likely to be in class NP18 but very significantly not in NP-Complete. 
Consequently, the fact that Shor’s algorithm has been successfully ‘demonstrated’ 
on quantum hardware has no predictive value for the success or otherwise of 
quantum algorithms in general. Still, regardless of how widely held the conjecture 
that P ≠ NP is, it remains conjecture. Furthermore, quantum algorithms differ 
significantly in structure and execution from their classical counterparts and, 
perhaps more importantly, are hardware dependent, which is not the case for 
most classical algorithms. For these reasons, the complexity of quantum 
algorithms is measured according to a different complexity class system which 
does not map directly to the classical system. For example, BQP and QMA are 
generally considered to be the bounded-error quantum analogues19 of the 
classical complexity classes P and NP respectively (Aaronson, 2009); however, 
Shor’s algorithm is believed to belong to NP in the classical system but not QMA 
in the quantum system, reflecting the fact that there exists no known classical 
algorithm that can factor large integers to their constituent prime factors in 
polynomial (or short) time.  
There remains much to be reconciled and understood in the mathematics and 
physics that underpin the paradigm of quantum computing. The opinions of those 
considered experts in the field vary widely: for example, Scott Aaronson, a 
                                                      
16 The significance of NP-Complete complexity for quantum information theory will be discussed 
later. 
17 Problem here means ‘problem type’ e.g. The Knapsack Problem or the Graph Colouring 
Problem not individual instances of that problem.  
18 Prime Factoring is also believed to be in both P and CoNP but is not considered to be NP-
Complete so that Shor’s algorithm does not solve the P vs NP problem. 
19 For discussion see, for example, Younes & Rowe (2015). 
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prominent quantum computation scholar, holds that P ≠ NP indeed sharply limits 
the possibilities of quantum computers; another prominent scholar, John Preskill, 
holds that quantum computers will themselves accelerate the development of 
quantum algorithms, addressing problems in ways that may not be immediately 
explicable; and David Deutch, a founder of the field, contends that the theory of 
quantum computation can be generalised to all physical processes in a complex 
multiverse, with classical computing explained as a special instance within a 
quantum paradigm.   
It is not disputed, however, that Shor’s algorithm itself is mathematically possible 
and verified, meaning that it works in principle. It has been demonstrated in 
practice for small integers (numbers) on working prototypes of quantum 
computers and so it is reasonable to think that the factoring of large numbers into 
their constituent primes is a possibility that may continue to become easier, 
cheaper and more available as quantum technologies mature, making quantum 
computing a legitimate concern for information security in the near to medium 
term. 
Currently, almost all security on the Internet uses the type of encryption that could 
be broken by a quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm as part of one or more 
protocols; this includes all app messaging encryption, email, current browser 
security, Internet banking and logins to cloud resources. Such evident risk might 
suggest we change our security protocols to ones that rely on NP-Complete 
problems, that is to mathematical problems to which no solution algorithm 
provides any significant speed up over trying every possible solution until the 
correct answer is found.  These are problems that most mathematicians believe 
to be impossible to solve easily for all cases, in the classical paradigm at least.  
There are a number of difficulties with this approach: public key cryptography, as 
it is currently conceived, relies on mathematical problems that are hard to solve 
every time no matter what the numbers are, otherwise some keys would be easy 
to discover or ‘crack’ and, in an operational security protocol, it would likely be 
impractical to ‘filter out’ these weak keys. Many, if not most, known problems in 
NP-Complete have so called ‘easy instances’ ruling them out as candidates (Talbot 
and Welsh, 2006). Another requirement for public key encryption systems is that 
the mathematical problem has an intentional ‘hidden trap door’ which effectively 
means that if a party has a key, they can easily decrypt a message. (This property 
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is often erroneously referred to as ‘being a one-way function’. The existence of 
true one-way functions has not been proven and if it were, it would prove that P 
≠ NP.) (Hartmanis & Hemachandra,1999). In addition to these two primary 
requirements for an ideal post-quantum encryption protocol, there are many 
other requirements around resources, implementation and practical integration 
with existing systems and protocols. In short, finding suitable candidate algorithms 
is enormously challenging. 
The search for post-quantum algorithms  
In response to the potential threat that the quantum computing paradigm poses 
to information security,  in December 2016 the US National Institute for Standards 
in Technology (NIST) issued a call for a first round of proposals for new so called 
quantum resistant algorithms to be used in the development of cryptographic 
standards (NIST, 2016). The standards are to be published as Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPSs)20 or Special Publications (SPs). NIST invites and 
encourages participation from the cryptographic community as well as the general 
public in a process of finding a number of candidate replacement algorithms. The 
first of what is expected to be several rounds of submissions closed in November 
2017 with 69 submissions accepted, of which five have subsequently been 
withdrawn.  
NIST’s approach is cautious, recognising that ‘the current scientific understanding 
of the power of quantum computers is far from comprehensive’ (NIST, 2017) and 
that candidate solution algorithms may be based on significantly different 
mathematics and design from those in current use. The organisation anticipates 
that the evaluation process may be ‘significantly more complex’ than the 
evaluation of the SHA-3 Hash algorithm candidates (Alshaikhli et al., 2012), for 
example, a process which took about eight years from call for proposals to official 
release of protocol details. This is without any acceptance period (where the 
community gains trust in the algorithm through its resistance to attack), 
                                                      
20 FIPS comprises 4 security levels and is the de facto international standard for information 
security prescribing  not only cryptography but also security policy and hardware measures (e.g. 
tamper evident enclosures and true atomic-decay random number generation). 
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commercial implementation and roll-out, processes which together may take the 
same number of years again.21 
NIST has also stated that it believes that the transition should happen well in 
advance of the appearance of large scale quantum computers ‘so that any 
information that is later compromised by quantum cryptanalysis is no longer 
sensitive when that compromise occurs’ (NIST, 2016). This is interesting on two 
counts, the first being that there exist current trusted cryptographic algorithms for 
data storage that are believed to be resistant to all currently known quantum 
algorithms (NIST, 2018) (even those which have never been implemented in 
hardware), implying that NIST expects that the field of quantum computation to 
produce more and different algorithms. This would suggest that NIST’s scientists 
do not put complete faith in any notion that quantum computing is intrinsically 
limited by either technical problems or the P ≠ NP conjecture. The second, and 
perhaps more significant point is the loose terminology of ‘large scale’ as opposed 
to the usual (to the literature) ‘universal’22 quantum computer.  
It has been generally considered that the goal of the field should be to produce 
some type of quantum analogue to what we currently consider a computer to be, 
a universal quantum computer, but this is unlikely to be the path that quantum 
computing takes. It would make little sense, for example, not to take advantage 
of the monumental advances in the field of AI in the development of new quantum 
technologies, and since algorithms from the classical and quantum paradigms are 
fundamentally different, in both concept and execution, a hybrid solution is the 
most likely possibility. This idea is not new: parts of Shor’s algorithm are classical 
in nature23 and the off-loading of compute-intensive operations to dedicated 
devices such as GPUs for graphics and ASICs for cryptographic routines, for 
example, is commonplace in current technologies. NIST itself states that it is aware 
that groups are developing hybrid cryptographic schemes although it is not 
considering such systems at present (NIST, 2017). In Europe, Europol echoes 
NIST’s views, citing European Union funding for research into post-quantum 
                                                      
21 See Bitcoin Forum (2013) for example, a forum discussion on the proposed use of SHA-3 in 
Bitcoin. 
22 The mathematical model for a 'universal' computer also known as the Turing machine (Turing, 
1936). 
23  The first part of the Shor’s algorithm converts the factoring problem into the problem of 
finding the period of a function, this is implemented classically. 
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algorithm candidates and warning that industry needs to keep up to date with 
developments if security is to be maintained (Europol, 2016). 
It is not denied by NIST and other agencies concerned with information security 
that quantum technologies, alone or as part of hybrid quantum-classical systems, 
pose a real and largely unquantifiable threat in the medium to long term. The 
question remains, however, if the response to this threat is adequate and 
appropriate. 
Information security in practice 
The information security industry has developed and matured around an attack-
fix cycle in which some, but significantly not all, security attacks are detected and 
analysed and appropriate 'fixes' are applied directly to systems or pushed out to 
end users as part of software upgrades. Software and its security then continue to 
operate as intended until the next attack and fix, or the next routine upgrade. 
Attacks, when detected, are usually dealt with promptly and are rarely publicised 
either because of their relative insignificance or because of fears of the damage to 
trust they can cause. The detection and mitigation of security attacks is complex 
and challenging but nonetheless generally relatively routine for most mature 
organisations, with resources allocated to security proportional to the sensitivity 
of information to be protected.  
Nevertheless, no system is ideal and compromises are made to balance conflicting 
requirements such as security and system response time, and this can mean 
exposing the system to risk. For instance, ‘light’ encryption has been sometimes 
used to avoid the computational overheads of RSA and similar protocols and here 
the algorithms themselves may be the focus of attack.  In June 2012, the business 
network LinkedIn was targeted in a cyberattack in which the passwords of more 
than 6 million users were stolen (Perlroth, 2018). It has been widely speculated, 
that the passwords had been protected using an 'unsalted' Hash algorithm24 such 
as SHA-1 or similar, a type of encryption known, even then (Theocharoulis et al., 
                                                      
24 Unsalted hashes mean that when two or more users choose the same password, the same 
hash is generated each time. In this scheme,an attacker who knows the hash for a given 
password, can find the password whenever it is chosen by a new user. Hence commonly used or 
'meaningful'  (e.g. Italia90) passwords are easy to crack when unsalted hashes are used. 
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2010), to be vulnerable to so called rainbow attacks25. Some data from the attack 
were posted to a Russian hacker site soon after and finally, in 2016, the full data 
were offered for sale on the so called dark web (Mathews, 2017). Despite the 
obvious vulnerability of SHA-1 and similar algorithms exposed by the 2012 
LinkedIn attack, the Internet company Yahoo was the target of a similar attack on 
its unsalted MD5 Hash-protected user data the following year, when 3 billion user 
accounts26 were compromised (Stempel and Finkle, 2018). Interestingly, this 
attack went undetected for some time until it was eventually discovered during 
an investigation into a subsequent attack which took place in 2014, when 500 
million user accounts were compromised.  Yahoo claims that by the time of the 
second attack it had moved 'the majority' of its accounts to the protection of 
stronger encryption (Stempel and Finkle, 2018) offered by the more secure, but 
resource-intensive, BCrypt algorithm (Alabaichi  et al., 2013). Assuming Yahoo was 
aware of the nature of the attack on LinkedIn and took immediate action to 
protect its users, it seems to have taken the company at least two years to switch 
one small algorithm for another, illustrating the challenges involved in such an 
operation and perhaps suggesting difficulties with the organisation’s security 
planning and maybe even with its overall software architecture. 
Aside from the vulnerabilities of weak encryption, there exist vulnerabilities in the 
implementation of stronger cryptographic protocols. Much attention was drawn 
to the Alibaba Group’s UC browser in 2015 following the leaking of classified 
documents by a former NSA contractor Edward Snowden27. The leak suggested 
that unencrypted geolocation and other data obtained from the browser were 
used to track its users. Following the revelation, the Citizen Lab, a research 
laboratory based in the University of Toronto, carried out an independent study 
on the UC browser which showed that user privacy was compromised; however, 
the lab could not confirm if the weaknesses that they found were those that were 
highlighted by the leak. In 2015, the UC browser had approximately 500 million 
users, most of whom were located in China and India. A later study on another 
browser popular in China, Tencent’s QQ mobile browser (Knockel et al., 2018), 
                                                      
25 The attacker precalculates hashes of passwords before the attack and simply compares hashes 
found in the attack with those precalculated hashes. 
26 These large numbers indicate that some users set up numerous accounts and some were likely 
to have be fraudulent accounts. 
27 See, for example, The Guardian (2017). 
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showed that data belonging to its hundreds of millions of users were also 
vulnerable to a so called man-in-the-middle attack with ‘state actor capabilities’. 
This research is of particular interest as it demonstrates weakness in ‘textbook 
RSA’ implementations28. Such implementations are considered to be poor 
cryptography but are nonetheless in use and provide the only security option 
freely available to many millions of Internet users.  Whether these weaknesses are 
accidental or by design is open to debate – the Chinese companies involved both 
conduct cutting-edge research, including research into quantum computation, 
meaning there is strong support for the ‘by design’ argument in the revelations 
made by Snowden. If the content of these documents is accurate, it is likely that 
no browser is secure. However, security issues also exist elsewhere on the 
Internet, including in areas where surveillance is unlikely to be currently a 
contributory factor. 
The ‘Internet of Things’, for example, makes extensive use of Radio-Frequency 
IDentification or RFID tags. These tags or motes29 work wirelessly and remotely 
and carry only around 2,000 bytes making it impossible for them to support strong 
cryptographic protocols. Technologies in this early stage industry are still in a 
phase of intensive evolution and despite guidance from organisations such as the 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), for 
example, there is as yet no clear policy for security of the Internet of Things.30  This 
lack of policy, coupled with its generally weak security, creates a potential point 
of vulnerability where the Internet of Things’ cyber-physical systems join the 
Internet proper (Shah et al., 2016). 
Even in the absence of quantum technologies, the security of systems which 
interface with the Internet has been demonstrated to have considerable 
vulnerability31. However, there are key areas which appear, at least, to be 
considerably more secure and resilient. Areas such as banking and finance in 
general, utilities such as national electricity grids and water and sensitive 
industries and governments are generally better protected than social media 
                                                      
28 As RSA is described in textbooks with no enhancements. 
29A mote or remote is a wireless transceiver that also acts as a remote sensor. 
30 There exist a small number of industry specific IoT security frameworks and best practice 
guidelines, all of which are still in the in development phase. There exists no overarching 
standard to date. See, for example (Microsoft, 2018). 
31 Non Internet facing systems are also at security risk, but attacks on these systems require 
onsite access. 
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platforms, for example. Significantly though, any attacks on these critical systems 
are likely to have serious and far reaching consequences.  
From their early design phase, security in critical systems must be carefully 
planned and managed according to relevant industry standards and organisational 
policy. This is in stark contrast to the often ad hoc arrangements of less critical 
systems. However, as critical systems evolve to meet changing requirements, or 
in response to security threats and attacks, weaknesses will appear in their 
security. If properly managed, weakness can generally be detected and analysed 
and appropriate modifications made to the system to reestablish and maintain the 
desired level of security. Ideally, this cycle continues until such a point as it is 
decided that, for security, cost or operational reasons, the system should be 
replaced. However, this cycle can be broken and consequently vulnerabilities in 
security may appear. Sometimes, large complex systems may be insufficiently 
understood by those who manage them and as the systems grow in complexity 
through maintenance and modification, understanding lessens and vulnerability 
increases. Although software companies may issue advice on operating system 
and networking security etc., it may be difficult for organisations to interpret and 
incorporate different strands of security information into a coherent secure policy 
for their organisation, or the recommended security measures may simply be 
beyond budgets. This is especially true in areas and times of political instability or 
economic challenge, rendering systems that are critical to infrastructure 
vulnerable to attack.   
Since 2014, the computer systems of Ukraine’s state bodies, infrastructure, media, 
transport and politics have repeatedly been the target of cyber attacks32.  Russia 
has been widely accused of backing the attackers but denies any involvement. The 
scale of the attacks is unprecedented with, for example, more than 6,500 attacks 
on state institutions over a two month period in late 2016 alone. These attacks 
exploited a wide range of security loopholes and ranged from a highly 
orchestrated operation in which the electricity supply from three separate 
substations was cut off in a single attack33 to attacks on Ukraine’s financial and 
transport sectors.  It has been reported that the Sandworm group was responsible 
                                                      
32 Speaking to Wired magazine, the NATO ambassador with responsibility for cybersecurity 
commented 'You can’t really find a space in Ukraine where there hasn’t been an attack' 
(Greenberg A. 2017a). 
33 Power was later manually switched on again by the electricity company’s engineers. 
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for at least some of the attacks which involved malicious softwares including 
BlackEnergy 3 and KillDisk (Fireeye, 2018). Sandworm specialises in trojan attacks 
and is believed to have targeted ICS/SCADA and energy companies worldwide; it 
is one of several Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups currently operating 
globally (Greenberg, 2017). The US government has reported finding BlackEnergy 
malware on the networks of American power and water utilities, although here 
security was adequate to prevent damage (Greenberg, 2017a). 
It has be suggested that the cyberwar on Ukraine has served as a de facto training 
ground for groups such as Sandworm and other APT groups with some attacks first 
seen in Ukraine quickly appearing in other jurisdictions.  Believed to have 
originated in Ukraine, the NotPetya malware was responsible for a global rapid 
cyber attack in June 2017.  The malware obtains user credentials from an infected 
host and uses them to connect to other points on the network, thus propagating 
the malware. In this way, just one machine infected with the malicious software 
can infect an entire system. NotPeyta, ostensibly a ransomware, has a highly 
unsophisticated ransom collection mechanism but considerable data destruction 
and encryption capabilities and consequently is considered not to be a true 
ransomware but rather to be designed to cause maximum disruption and financial 
loss to its targets (LogRhythm, 2017). It is likely that this malware was used as a 
test or reconnaissance attack. NotPeyta appeared just one month after WannaCry, 
another rapid cyber attack malware which caused major disruption in Spain, the 
UK , Russia, Japan, France and Taiwan. Believed to have originated in North Korea, 
this ransomware counted the British National Health Service (NHS) and Spain’s 
telecoms company, Telefonica, among its victims. WannaCry34 exploited a 
weakness in Microsoft’s Windows operating system for which a security patch had 
existed for about one month before the attack (Mathews, 2017a), highlighting the 
delay some critical service providers have in implementing security updates.  
The roles of artificial intelligence in security 
AI has recently entered the field of cyber security, with companies offering 
machine learning (ML) based defences against some of the most difficult and 
                                                      
34 One month before the WannaCry attack, a group called The Shadow Brokers released details of 
the weakness that the ransomware exploited in Microsoft’s Operating Systems, it is alleged that 
the weakness was originally discovered by the NSA. See, for example: (Gibbs, 2017) 
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pervasive cyber attacks. A relatively sophisticated example comes from the UK 
company Darktrace35 which has developed an algorithm, Enterprise Immune 
System, that is capable of detecting and defending against malicious network 
activity in near real time through the use of unsupervised ML techniques. This type 
of machine learning allows the algorithm to detect known and novel threats by 
actively self-learning patterns of normal and abnormal network behaviours rather 
than depending on known rules, models or datasets. Darktrace’s software has 
been demonstrated, for example, to detect a new strain of ransomware in a 
network and to have the ability to counter that attack in a time frame of under 
one minute36. The algorithm has also been demonstrated to limit an 'exfiltration 
of data by an insider' attack (theft and export of data to the Cloud, for example) 
(Viega, 2018). In principle, this self-learning approach provides an added layer of 
security by constantly searching networks and interconnected networks for 
anomalous areas in large data sets and making decisions to act when deemed 
necessary. In contrast, traditional approaches depend on searching for evidence 
that exactly matches predescribed attacks and so novel attacks and approaches 
can go undetected. 
In cyber security, artificial intelligence is dual use: it has the potential to be used 
in both defence and attack. AI network security algorithms may be vulnerable to 
data poisoning attacks, for example, in which misleading data is introduced by an 
attacker. Such an attack might be used as part of a scheme to train a network to 
tolerate intrusion. It is also likely that unsupervised ML might be used in more 
sophisticated and labour intensive attacks such as spear phishing,37 for example, 
where AI simulates more human-like behaviours and so attacks more readily 
escape detection. The potential of this so called ‘adversarial AI’ is not fully known; 
however, attacks as diverse as speech synthesis for impersonation, attacks that 
subvert cyber physical systems such as self-drive cars and the automation of 
techniques involved in surveillance, for example, are expected in the near to 
medium term38 (Brundage and Avin, 2018).  
                                                      
35 According to its website (www.darktrace.com), Darktrace was founded in Cambridge, UK, in 
2013 by mathematicians and machine learning specialists from the University of Cambridge, 
together with world-leading intelligence experts from MI5 and GCHQ. 
36 Attackers often spend months inside a network before being detected. 
37 Spear phishing involves an attempt to steal sensitive information from targeted individuals via 
electronic means. 
38 Here, near to medium term is within the next five years. 
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The advent of AI as a security threat poses enormous challenges, challenges that 
translate into increased financial burden for organisations with data to protect. It 
is likely that as AI matures there will be a cycle of rapid growth in both AI defence 
and attack technologies. In response to this perceived threat, in February 2018, a 
group of 26 specialists from a wide range of disciplines and institutions including 
Oxford University’s Future of Humanity Institute, Cambridge University’s Centre 
for the Study of Existential Risk, OpenAI and the Center for a New American 
Security39 published a report on the potential security risks of AI. The one hundred 
page document, The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, 
Prevention, and Mitigation (Brundage and Avin 2018), outlines the group’s 
understanding of current and potential future threats posed by AI to security and 
makes a number of recommendations for future research and development, as 
well as highlighting the importance of governance and policy. The report details 
what its authors see as risks related to the publishing of potentially sensitive 
details of AI research (a practice common to all areas of computer science) and 
strongly recommends collaboration between the research community and 
governments in efforts to anticipate and mitigate AI attacks. The report focuses 
on the need to develop policies and regulation that are informed by technology 
expertise and are properly enforceable in the domain without unnecessarily 
restricting research.  The authors draw attention to examples of introductory 
resources for policymakers in AI (CNAS, 2017; Buchanan and Taylor, 2017). 
Already, there is much ongoing research in the area of Adversarial AI in particular 
(Brundage and Avin, 2018) and digital security in general, for example, by the 
National Cyber Security Centre as part of GCHQ in the UK (National Cyber Security 
Centre, 2018). A high proportion of large scale projects include workshopping and 
similar initiatives involving representatives of large technology companies, 
government agencies and research institutions. Many of these projects focus on 
US security concerns and are often aligned with political research centres such as 
the Harvard Kennedy Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, which in 
2018 lists three ongoing projects: Managing the Atom, a project concerned with 
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; Managing the Microbe, concerned 
with the threat of biological weapons; and the Cyber Security Project, which 
                                                      
39 The Center for a New American Security is a US-based bipartisan national security think-tank. 
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concerns itself with how cybersecurity will shape international conflict (Belfer 
Center, 2018).  
The implications of maturing quantum technologies 
Due to the fundamental vulnerabilities inherent in current AI systems 
(vulnerabilities to data poisoning and model inversion40 for example), an increase 
in adversarial AI attacks is likely as AI technologies become more pervasive.  These 
attacks are expected to be especially effective, finely targeted and difficult to 
attribute (Brundage and Avin 2018). The task of mitigating an increasingly 
enhanced attack load, including diverse and dynamic threats coming from 
adversarial AI, will eventually be beyond the capabilities and budgets of many 
organisations and infrastructure agencies. One possible response to such 
challenge is to move to fortified secure platforms where a collective security is 
provided by an overarching well-resourced body. This is not an entirely new idea: 
already, for many organisations, the increasing complexity of the task of providing 
a secure integrated internet environment has been met, for example, by the use 
of Google Cloud41 together with G Suite (a platform that provides secure 
integrated electronic mailing (gmail); document Cloud storage (Google Docs); 
device management (Google Mobile) and other related services) (G Suite, 2018).  
As technology companies such as Google position themselves to provide more 
comprehensive secure options to businesses and infrastructure facing growing 
security threats to their operation, the slow response to recommendations of 
collaboration between the research community, industry and governments in 
addressing the growing menace of adversarial AI is likely to be too little too late. 
If technology companies can provide protection to businesses, infrastructure and 
possibly even some governments, that exceeds any other option that these 
organisations have available to them, it is likely that many will migrate their 
operations to these secure environments. It is probable that there will be at least 
some competition in the space; however, it is also likely that only a few small to 
medium sized organisations will be sufficiently resourced and competent to 
provide for an independent fully integrated secure environment as the adversarial 
                                                      
40 In model inversion, the training data of a classifier is manipulated. 
41 Machine learning tools and APIs; the enterprise Maps APIs; and also the Android phones, 
tablets and Chromebooks that access the cloud. 
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AI threat grows. Unless governments provide an alternative, small to medium 
sized organisations will have little option outside of the secure spaces provided by 
the technology companies. 
In the near term, there remain non-Google alternatives for individuals and 
organisations requiring secure Cloud and communications facilities. Google is not 
the largest of cloud-based services: Amazon, Microsoft Azure and IBM are all 
technically bigger, as are China’s Tencent and Alibaba. Google, however, offers 
perhaps the most obviously and fully integrated secure platform, with an 
emphasis on seamless integration of services and machine learning. Significantly, 
Google also has a post-quantum cryptography programme and recently the 
company substituted the RSA algorithm in Google Chrome with New Hope, a post-
quantum algorithm (Pascaline, 2016). The New Hope algorithm is known to be less 
than secure against certain post-quantum attacks – it has known vulnerabilities to 
attack by a system with quantum capabilities (Malloy and Hollenbeck, 2016). 
Consequently, it is unlikely that Google considers the New Hope algorithm to be a 
credible candidate for the replacement of RSA in Chrome; in its current iteration 
at least. It is more likely that the purpose of this exercise was to assess the 
company’s capability of swapping out encryption algorithms without any 
downtime or incident. If this is the case, the exercise was likely considered 
successful. In the absence of truly secure post-quantum algorithms, it is essential 
that such swaps be easily and immediately achievable at the first sign of attack in 
order to limit data exposure or loss and it is likely that the large technology 
companies are continually researching and assessing new candidate post-
quantum cryptographic algorithms. As discussed earlier, NIST expects that post-
quantum encryption algorithms may differ significantly in their underlying 
mathematics and design from those in current use, making swapping out 
encryption algorithms in a live system a truly challenging task, far beyond the 
capabilities of all but a very few organisations. 
As we approach the post-quantum horizon, the time when a device can efficiently 
and cost effectively run Shor’s algorithm, it is possible that large, well designed 
and competently managed systems of commerce and infrastructure with good AI-
enhanced security will remain adequately secure, even in the face of adversarial 
AI. However, every instance of RSA-based cryptography will remain potentially 
vulnerable to attack, as any development of quantum and hybrid quantum devices 
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for malicious purposes will naturally be covert in nature. For all but the most 
expert technology companies, preemptive substitution of current public key 
cryptographic algorithms with post-quantum alternatives brings a high risk of 
weakening security. As quantum technologies mature, the only remaining viable 
option for even large mature organisations and many governments may be to 
move to a commercial platform offering post-quantum secured, AI-enhanced 
cloud, device management and communication services. Such a scenario would 
afford Google – and any other company which emerges with similar capabilities – 
potentially enormous political leverage as that horizon comes into view.  
The recommendation from the Brundage and Avin (2018) report that 
governments should partner with research institutes to address these threats is 
important. These partnerships should work toward the development of secure 
platforms in the public domain outside of commercial technology companies such 
as Google. These post-quantum platforms need only be relatively rudimentary; 
however, it is essential that they offer the required security at low or zero cost to 
the user. There is a role for the EU here and at some of the funds already allocated 
to quantum technologies could possibly be directed to such a project. For poorer 
countries, such development should be taken on by the open-source community, 
in coordination with NGOs and multilateral institutions. This is essential to protect 
against these countries becoming unduly dependent on technology companies for 
their infrastructural and national security. 
Secondly, during the phase of development of post-quantum algorithms, exposure 
to and understanding of the quantum paradigm needs to be increased.  As 
highlighted by Harrow (2012), in addition to using computers to solve problems, 
we also think in ways that are informed by the programming and use of computers 
in the current paradigm. To a large extent, we frame and attempt to understand 
and solve many of the problems we encounter in terms of ideas and methods of 
information transmission, optimization and error correction. Concepts as diverse 
as sentiment analysis, weather forecasting and cognitive processes are all 
described within the bounds of our classical computational paradigm and our 
understandings are thus limited by its constraints.  
Ideas of security, cryptography and the nature of information itself are also subject 
to the paradigm in which they are conceived and operate. Quantum computation, 
like the quantum theory that lies behind it, is counter-intuitive when viewed 
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through a classical lens. It is impossible to anticipate the novel approaches that 
will emerge from the field of quantum computation unless we are engaged in the 
paradigm. It is essential that we democratise the understanding of quantum 
information theory and normalise the use of its concepts in order to ensure that 
the paradigm shift in computing is not the preserve of a small corporate elite and 
a few, often corporate sponsored, research institutions. The Microsoft 
corporation has already made available a high-level accessible independent 
development environment (IDE), the Microsoft Quantum Development Kit, which 
works with Microsoft Visual Studio (Microsoft, 2018a). More similar initiatives, 
ideally from the open source community, would improve popular exposure to 
quantum computation. Explicit coding skills may not be required to familiarize the 
public with quantum information theory; initiatives such as the development of 
games that operate in the quantum paradigm would also provide an attractive 
introduction to the field and should be sponsored by government funds. Only 
widespread popular adoption and understanding of the quantum paradigm can 
prevent undesirable monopolies. 
The final strand of defence of an independent Internet in an AI-enhanced post-
quantum era is the prompt introduction of appropriate and effective legislation. 
Such legislation should be developed in partnership with domain experts in 
information security, government policy experts and the research community to 
ensure that any new legislation can be implemented in such a way that its 
intention is properly realisable. This was not the case in the drafting of the 
European Union’s recent General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) legislation. It 
has been reported that this legislation has been difficult to implement in many 
cases due to its lack of compatibility with the nature and workings of the domain 
in which it is intended to operate and in particular in the context of current 
machine-learning algorithms (Goodman and Flaxman, 2016). Furthermore, the 
way we make and implement legislation needs to be reconsidered here and in 
relation to information technologies in general. The legal processes we use must 
be fit for purpose and capable of anticipating change. This does not mean that 
legislation needs to predict the precise changes that will occur – this is not possible 
– but rather legal processes must be such that they are capable of responding to 
a dynamic system of shifting and interacting paradigms; this will require both new 
processes and interdisciplinary expertise. Scholars from the social sciences and 
humanities can and must engage with developments that have the most profound 
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implications for the future of human communications: mapping the potentially 
extraordinary computational horizon is far too important to be left to computer 
scientists – or, simply, to Google.  
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